Abstract. In this paper we reduce the question of validity of a first-order intuitionistic formula without equality to generating ground instances of this formula and then checking whether the instances are deducible in a propositional intuitionistic tableaux calculus, provided that the propositional proof is compatible with the way how the instances were generated. This result can be seen as a form of the Herbrand theorem, and so it provides grounds for further theoretical investigation of computer-oriented intuitionistic calculi.
Introduction
In its classical formulation, Herbrand's theorem [9] relates the question of validity of a first-order formula in Skolem prenex form, ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ), with the question of validity of one of its Herbrand extensions: The formula ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is valid if, and only if, m i φ(t i,1 , . . . ,t i,n ) is valid for some m ≥ 1 and some collection of ground Herbrand terms t i, j . Since every classical first-order formula can be reduced preserving satisfiability, through the Skolemisation, to this Skolem prenex form, Herbrand's theorem, essentially, provides a way to reduce the question of validity of first-order formulae to propositional logic. Even though the required Herbrand extension and the terms t i, j cannot be computed recursively (for otherwise first-order logic would be decidable), this result is particularly interesting for the automated reasoning community as it gives birth to a number of highly efficient proof methods such as resolution [21] and the inverse method [14] . Availability of similar results for other logics would also be of significant interest.
Yet, there is no general Herbrand-like theorem for intuitionistic logic, where formulae cannot in general be preprocessed into a prenex normal form, and the construction of a proof is often sensitive to the order in which the connectives and quantifiers are analysed. The biggest obstacle is that the Skolemisation does not preserve intuitionistic satisfiability. Consider, for example, formulae ¬∀xP(x) ⊃ ∃y¬P(y) and ∃x¬P(x) ⊃ ∃y¬P(y). The first of them is not intuitionistically valid while the other one, obviously, is; however, the Skolemised forms of the two coincide. These complications lead to the existence of limited forms of Herbrand's theorem for particular classes of intuitionistic formulae only [15, 16, 3] .
While classical Herbrand's theorem is often proved semantically, it can also be obtained as a direct consequence of Gentzen's cut elimination theorem [7] : The question of the deducibility of a first-order formulae in Skolem prenex form can be reduced to the deducibility of a Herbrand extension, and then the necessary Herbrand terms can be extracted from the cut-free proof. In fact, a similar idea is used in free-variable tableau methods [8] , where quantifiers are dealt with separately from dealing with the propositional proof skeleton. Since free-variable tableau techniques are also available for intuitionistic logic [22, 23] , one can hope to obtain deductive forms of intuitionistic Herbrand's theorem, in which the question of the deducibility of intuitionistic first-order formulae is reduced to the deducibility of a Herbrand extension.
We base the investigations presented in this paper on our earlier results in [10] , where we introduce a tableau-based calculus without explicit rules dealing with quantifiers. Prior to proof search, we replace in a given formula bound variables with free variables and parameters depending on the polarity of the bounding quantifiers. Then, an admissible substitution suggests the correct order of quantifier rule applications, and a ground tableau proof of the given formula can be reconstructed, making it unnecessary to backtrack over different orders of quantifier rule applications. The soundness of the resulting calculus is provided by ordering restrictions in the way similar to the one considered in [20, 13, 22, 23] for calculi with quantifier rules.
The method presented in [10] is similar, to some extent, to the connection method for intuitionistic logic pioneered by Wallen [25] and developed further in [18, 19, 11, 24] . The key difference is in the way how we define admissibility of substitutions. In [25] , the notion of admissibility is used to model proof search in a particular sequent intuitionistic calculus, and, therefore, this calculus is tightly integrated into the method. One has to search for an admissible substitution even for propositional intuitionistic formulae, and it is not easy to replace the chosen sequent calculus with a different proof system. In our approach, we try to separate dealing with quantifiers, impermutabilities, and propositional intuitionistic reasoning. To do that, we use admissibility to check eigenvariable conditions, we use a propositional proof system to check the deducibility, and, finally, we check that the propositional proof agrees with quantifiers. From the implementation point of view, some research in this direction was done in [17] , where a tableau-like search for connections is implemented; however, they still use string unification in admissibility checks. Our admissibility checks are based on much simpler term unification; the price we have to pay is more complex proof search on the ground level.
It is this separation of propositional proof search and the search for admissible substitutions (with further check that the two agree), what allows us to formulate an analog of Herbrand's theorem. We reduce the question of the deducibility of an intuitionistic first-order formula to the deducibility of an analog of the Herbrand extension in an intuitionistic propositional calculus. We solve the problems with impermutabilities by imposing restrictions on derivations in the propositional calculus.
Preliminaries
We use the standard terminology of first-order logic without equality. The first order language is constructed over a signature Sig containing a finite (possibly empty) set of functional symbols, and a finite (nonempty) set of predicate symbols, the logical connectives: the universal quantifier symbol ∀, the existential quantifier symbol ∃, and the propositional connectives for the implication (⊃), disjunction (∨), conjunction (∧), and negation (¬).
As for the set of variables Vr, we assume that Vr consists of two disjoint countable sets: mVr (original variables) and iVr (indexed variables) so that Vr = mVr∪iVr, where the following holds: for any v ∈ mVr and any positive integer (index) k (k = 1, 2, . . .), iVr contains the indexed variable k v.
Additionally, we extend the signature Sig in the following way: for any natural number (index) k (k = 1, 2, . . .) and any symbol s from Sig, we add the indexed symbol k s to Sig denoting the constructed extension by eSig. For example, 1 ∨, 3 ⊃, and 5 ∀ are symbols of the extended signature. These left upper indices are used to distinguish connectives in different copies of the same formula, stemming from multiplicities, to encode impermutabilities.
The notions of terms, atomic formulae, literals, formulae, free and bound variables, and scopes of quantifiers over both Sig and eSig are defined in the usual way [8] and assumed to be known to the reader. We assume that no two quantifiers in any formula have a common variable, which can be achieved by renaming bound variables.
If the formula F is constructed by renaming (some or all) bound variables in a formula F, we call F a variant of F.
An equation is an unordered pair of terms s and t written as s ≈ t. Assume L is a literal of the form R(t 1 , . . . ,t n ) (or ¬R(t 1 , . . . ,t n )) and M is a literal of the form R(s 1 , . . . , s n ) (or ¬R(s 1 , . . . , s n ), respectively), where R is a predicate symbol and
A substitution, σ, is a finite mapping from variables to terms denoted by σ = {x 1 → t 1 , . . . , x n → t n }, where variables x 1 , . . . , x n are pairwise different and x i = t i for all i = 1 . . . n. For an expression Ex and a substitution σ, the result of the application of σ to Ex is denoted by Ex · σ. For any set Ξ of expressions, Ξ · σ denotes the set obtained by the application of σ to every expression in Ξ. If Ξ is a set of (at least two) expressions and Ξ · σ is a singleton, then σ is called a unifier of Ξ.
Expressions of the form Tφ or Fφ, where φ is a formula, are termed signed formulae, and T and F are called signs. A sequent is a non-empty multiset of signed formulae having no common bound variables in pairs. Capital Greek letters Γ, ∆,. . . denote multisets of signed formulae, and we write TΓ (or F∆) to express the fact that all formulae in Γ (in ∆) are of the form Tφ (of the form Fψ, respectively). We denote by sf(Γ) the multiset of all sign free formulae obtained from the formulae in Γ by deleting signs. For example, sf({Tp, Fq}) = {p, q}.
We say that an occurrence of a subformula φ in ψ is
or ∃xξ and φ is positive (negative) in ξ; -negative (positive) if ψ is of the form (χ ⊃ ξ) or ¬χ and φ is positive (negative) in χ.
The polarity of an occurrence of a subformula φ in a sequent S = TΓ, F∆ is determined by the polarity of the corresponding occurrence of φ in the formula ( sf(TΓ)) ⊃ Γ, TA, FA
No sequent contains more than one formula of the form Fξ. In the T ⊃ and T¬ rules, the expression Fφ might be empty (that is, the sequent contains no formula of the form Fψ). In the rule (Ax), A is an atomic formula. In the rules (F∀) and (T∃) the variable y has no free occurrences in the conclusions of the rule.
Fig. 1. Tableau calculus T J for intuitionistic logic
( sf(F∆)): If a subformula φ occurs positively in sf(F∆) or negatively in sf(TΓ), we say that the occurrence of φ is positive in S, otherwise, the occurrence of φ is negative.
If an occurrence of a subformula ∀xψ is positive (or an occurrence of ∃xψ is negative) in a formula φ (or in a sequent S), we say that the quantifier ∀x (respectively, ∃x) is strong in the formula φ (in the sequent S); otherwise, the quantifier ∀x (respectively, ∃x) is weak in the formula φ (in the sequent S). If a quantifier Qx, where Q is ∀ or ∃, is strong (weak) in a sequent S, the variable x is called strong (weak) in S.
An indexed variable k v can be a free variable or parameter depending on v being weak or strong, respectively in a sequent S. For technical reasons only, if v is a weak (strong) variable, then k v ( k v) denotes its free variable (parameter) 'copy'.
A formula φ is intuitionistically valid if, and only if, the sequent Fφ can be derived, for example, in the calculus T J adapted from [23] , with the sole difference that we use the tableau notation whereas [23] uses the sequential one.
Calculus T J *
The results of this paper are based on our research published in [10] . In order to make this paper self-contained, we repeat the necessary notions and definitions in this section.
Let µ(φ) be the quantifier-free result of removing all quantifiers from φ. Let for a formula φ fix the one-to-one function ω mapping strong in φ variable x ∈ mVr into the parameter 1 x ∈ iVr and a weak in φ variable x ∈ mVr into the free variable 1 x ∈ iVr (mind the left upper indices!). We also assign left upper indices to the occurrences of logical connectives in ω(φ)-originally, the left upper index of all logical connectives is 1; in the process of derivation other indices are also assigned, see Convention below.
We extend the definition of µ and ω to sequents and arbitrary sets of formulae in the obvious way. (There is no ambiguity in the definition of ω since all the formulae of any sequent have no common variables in pairs.)
In any tableaux-style calculus one has to deal with the necessity to apply quantifier rules. A distinctive feature of our approach is that we remove quantifiers from given formulae; and multiple quantifier rule applications can be modelled by means of the (TCopying) rule defined below.
If The notion of a maximal Q-subformula is extended to the case of µω-images of sequents in the following way: If a formula Qxφ is a maximal Q-subformula of a (usual) sequent S, then for every j ∈ N, the formula j µ(ω(Qxφ)) is a maximal Q-subformula of S µω . Besides, j x is called a principal variable of j µ(ω(Qxφ)). Moreover, if a variable y is latent in Qxφ, then for every j ∈ N, the variable j y is latent in j µ(ω(Qxφ)).
Assume we are interested in the validity of a closed formula φ. In our calculus T J * , proof search begins with the starting sequent S µω = Fµ(ω(φ) ). The rules of T J * are given in Fig. 2 . Note that the quantifier rules became redundant and are absent from the calculus.
(Quasi)-proof. A sequent is said to be closed if it contains occurrences of both TA and FA, where A is an atomic formula. A sequent is quasi-closed if it contains occurrences of both TA and FB, where A and B are atomic formulae and A ≈ B modulo Σ (A, B) . Applying the above-mentioned rules 'from top to bottom' to a starting sequent and afterwards to its 'consequences', and so on, we construct a so-called inference tree for the starting sequent. An inference tree is called a quasi-proof (proof) tree for a starting sequent if all its leaves are quasi-closed (closed).
No sequent contains more than one formula of the form Fξ. In the (T ⊃) and (T¬) rules, the expression Fφ might be empty (that is, the sequent contains no formula of the form Fψ).
In the rule (TCopying): -φ is a maximal ∀-subformula of S µω ; -l is a new index, that is, l φ does not have common latent variables with other formulae of the sequent.
Fig. 2. Calculus T J *

Main Result for T J *
Let φ be a formula. By (i, φ) we denote the i-th occurrence of a logical connective (which could be a propositional connective or a quantifier) in φ when the formula φ is read from left to right. If (i, φ) is the occurrence of a logical connective , we also refer to this occurrence as i . Moreover, in what follows, any occurrence i of a symbol in a formula F is treated as a new symbol. Therefore, i and j are different symbols which denote the same logical "operation" . We also refer to a bound variable x bound by the quantifier i Qx as i x. For a formula φ, we write i ≺ φ j if, and only if, in φ, the selected occurrence j of the logical connective is in the scope of the selected occurrence i of . For example, if φ is ( 1 ¬ ψ 2 ∧ (ξ 3 ∨ χ)), then 2 ∧ ≺ φ 1 ¬ and 2 ∧ ≺ φ 3 ∨. We extend the relation ≺ φ to bound variables: x ≺ φ y if the quantifier Qy is in the scope of the quantifier Q x (recall that no two quantifiers in any formula have a common variable, which can be achieved by renaming bound variables). For example, for the formula φ = 1 ∀x 2 ∃yP(x, y), we have: x ≺ φ y.
We also extend the (transitive and irreflexive) relation ≺ φ to the case of indexed logical connectives in the following way: for any i and j and for any formula φ, we have Let Tr be an inference tree in the calculus T J * then the union of the relations ≺ φ , defined for all formulae φ from Tr, is a transitive and irreflexive relation denoted by ≺ Tr .
Any substitution σ induces a (possibly empty) relation σ as follows: y σ x if, and only if, there exists x → t ∈ σ such that x is a free variable, the term t contains y, and y is a parameter. For example, consider the substitution σ = { 1 x → f ( 2 y, 1 v, 1 z) The following result can easily be extracted from [10] .
Proposition 1. A sequent Fφ is deducible in the calculus T J if, and only if, a quasiproof tree Tr for F(µ(ω(φ))) can be constructed in the calculus T J * , and there exists a substitution σ such that (i) Tr · σ is a proof tree, (ii) σ is an admissible substitution for Tr, and (iii) the tree Tr is compatible with σ.
Herbrand's Theorem
This section develops the ideas suggested in [12] : Given a first-order intuitionistic formula, we generate ground instances of this formula and then check whether the instances are deducible in a propositional intuitionistic tableaux calculus, provided that the propositional proof is compatible with the way how the instances were generated. First, we introduce a specialised convolution calculus, which allows one to "gather" the required multiple occurrences of subformulae. Then, we introduce the notion of a Herbrand quasi-universe and formulate the main result of this paper.
The Convolution Calculus
We reduce the deducibility of first-order sequents to the deducibility of quantifier-free sequents. Let Tr be an inference tree for a starting sequent S (of the form Fφ) in the calculus T J * . To every sequent Sq in Tr, we assign the sequent ι(Sq), termed the spur of Sq, as follows.
-If Sq is a leaf of Tr, having the form TF 1 , . . . , TF n , FG, then ι(Sq) is TF 1 , . . . , TF n , FG. -If Sq is not a leaf node and spurs are assigned to all its successors, we assign ι(Sq)
to Sq in accordance with the rules of the convolution calculus given in Fig. 3 : If a rule R of the calculus T J * is applied to the sequent Sq in Tr, the spur is assigned to Sq as prescribed by the rule ↑ R of the convolution calculus applied "bottom up".
The rule (↑ T¬) assigns the spur Γ, T ¬ι(A) ∧ ¬ι(A), Fφ to the sequent Γ, T k ¬A, Fφ.
Fig. 3. Convolution Calculus
The result of the assignment of spurs to all sequents in Tr is called the spurred image of Tr and is denoted by ι(Tr). The top node of ι(Tr) is denoted by ι(S), where S is a starting sequent. It should be clear that ι(Tr) consists of quantifier-free formulae only. Moreover, any formula in ι(Tr) consists of the symbols of the original signature only. Next, we are going to reduce the deducibility of sequences to the deducibility of spurs in a tableau propositional calculus. Note that, since all the necessary multiple occurrences of subformulae are introduced to the spur, the propositional calculus is contraction free.
Let pT J be the calculus obtained from T J by deleting all its quantifier rules and replacing the rules (T ⊃) and (T¬) with
respectively. We extend the definitions of admissible substitutions and compatibility of inference trees and substitutions to the case of pT J.
The following properties of proof trees can be easily proved by induction on the number of rules applications. Taking this proposition into account, we can reformulate Proposition 1 as follows. 
Intuitionistic Herbrand Theorem
Now we introduce our modification of the notions of the multiplicity [2, 25] and the Herbrand quasi-universe [12] . Let φ be a formula and φ 1 , . . . , φ n its variants. If φ, φ 1 , . . . , φ n does not have any bound and latent variables in pairs, then
Herbrand extension. Let ψ be a formula and ξ a ∧-duplication of φ. The result of the replacement of φ in ψ with ξ is called a one-step Herbrand extension of ψ if one of the following condition is satisfied:
(i) φ is a maximal negative ∀-subformula of ψ and ξ is a variant duplication of φ, which has no common bound and latent variables with ψ; (ii) φ is a negative ⊃-subformula (negative ¬-subformula) of ψ, and ξ is a identical duplication of φ.
Finally, the result of a finite sequence of one-step extensions consequently applied to a given formula ψ is called a Herbrand extension of ψ. The notion of a Herbrand quasi-universe, introduced in [12] and modified here for the intuitionistic case, plays the same role in our research as the usual Herbrand universe in the case of classical logic. Unlike the "usual" Herbrand universe, the quasi-universe also contains parameters in the case where strong variables occur in an initial sequent.
Herbrand quasi-universe. Let S be a sequent. Then HQ(S) denotes the following minimal set of terms called a Herbrand quasi-universe: (i) every constant and every parameter, occurring in S, belong to HQ(S) (if there is no constant in S then the special constant c 0 ∈ HQ(S)); (ii) if f is a k-ary functional symbol and terms t 1 , . . ., t k ∈ HQ(S) then f (t 1 , . . ., t k ) ∈ HQ(S). Proof. Note that we can assume that σ substitutes terms from a Herbrand quasi-universe only, which is followed from the subformula property of the calculi given above and from the fact that we can restrict ourselves with the consideration of substitutions being simultaneous most general unifiers of certain sets of terms.
Theorem 1. A sequent Fφ is deducible in the calculus T J if, and only if, there exist a Herbrand extension HE(φ) of φ and a substitution σ of terms from the Herbrand quasi-universe HQ(Fµ(HE(φ))) for all free variables in µ(HE(φ)) such that (i) σ is an admissible substitution for µ(HE(φ)) and (ii) there exists a proof tree for
Necessity. Let Fφ be deducible in the calculus T J. By Proposition 3, there exist a quasi-proof tree Tr for the sequent Fµ(ω(φ)) in T J * and a substitution σ such that (i) ι(Tr) · σ is a proof tree in pT J, (ii) σ is admissible for Tr, and (iii) ι(Tr) is compatible with σ.
Consider the top sequent ι(Fφ) of ι(Tr). By definitions of the convolution calculus and a Herbrand extension, there exists a sequence of one-step Herbrand extensions such that the sequents ι(Fφ) and Fµ(HE(φ)) coincide. This proves both items (i) and (ii).
Sufficiency. As in the case on the necessity, it follows from Proposition 3 and the properties of the convolution calculus and HE(φ).
We demonstrate our approach on a series of examples.
Example 1 (The rôle of admissibility).
Let φ be the following formula ∀x∃yP(x, y) ⊃ ∃y ∀x P(x , y ). All Herbrand extensions ξ k (= HE(φ)) of φ are of the form: 
which is deducible in pT J. However, σ i is not admissible for ξ k since we have 1 x i ≺ ξ k 1 y i , 1 y ≺ ξ k 1 x , 1 x σ i 1 x i , and 1 y i σ i 1 y , and therefore, 1 x i ξ k ,σ i 1 x i . As a consequence of Theorem 1, Fφ is not deducible in in T J. Note Fφ is also not classically deducible as shown in [12] .
Next, consider the formula φ = ∃y∀xP(x, y) ⊃ ∀x ∃y P(x , y ). Then similarly to the case considered above, HE(φ) = ∃ 1 y 1 ∀ 1 x 1 P( 1 x 1 , 1 y 1 ) ⊃ ∀ 1 x ∃ 1 y P( 1 x , 1 y ) and the substitution σ = { 1 x 1 → 1 x , 1 y → 1 y 1 }, is admissible for HE(φ). Moreover, the sequent Fµ(HE(φ)) · σ is deducible in pT J and any its proof tree is compatible with σ. Thus, the sequent Fφ is deducible in T J, i.e. it is intuitionistically valid.
Example 2 (The rôle of multiplicities).
Let φ be the formula ∃y∀xB(x, y) ⊃ ∃z(B(a, z) ∧ B(b, z)) and S be the sequent Fφ, where x, y, and z are variables; a and b are constants; and B is a predicate symbol. We show that φ is an intuitionistically valid formula.
If we do not introduce copies of subformulae, there is no substitution σ of a term from HQ(µ(S)) = {a, b, y} for the free variable x such that HQ(µ(S)) · σ is deducible in pT J. Therefore, Theorem 1 is not applicable.
If, however, we consider a Herbrand extension of φ,
and substitution σ = { 1 x → a, 2 x → b, z → y}, then the sequent FHQ(µ(S)) · σ is deducible in pT J. Obviously, σ substitutes terms from HQ(µ(HE(φ))) and it is admissible for µ(HE(φ)). Moreover, any proof tree for Fµ(HE(φ)) · σ in pT J is compatible with σ. By Theorem 1, we come to the conclusion that the sequent Fφ is deducible in T J and, therefore, φ is an intuitionistically valid formula.
